When is a mechanism designer justified in only asking for ordinal information about preferences? Simple examples show that even if the planner's goal (expressed by a social choice correspondence (SCC)) depends only on ordinal information, eliciting cardinal information may help with incentives. However, if agents may be uncertain about their own cardinal preferences, then a strong robustness requirement can justify the focus on ordinal mechanisms. Specifically, when agents' preferences over pure outcomes are strict, if a planner is able to implement an SCC (in ex post equilibrium) using a mechanism that is robust to interdependence of arbitrary form in cardinal preferences, then there must exist such a mechanism that elicits only ordinal preferences. The strictness assumption can be dropped if we further allow the possibility of non-expected-utility preferences.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been growing interest in mechanism design problems in which agents report an ordinal preference ranking of outcomes to a central mechanism, and the mechanism chooses, as a function of these rankings, a lottery over outcomes. Some examples of such problems are as follows.
• Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) consider a problem of allocating n heterogeneous objects to n agents, one object per agent. Each agent reports a ranking over the objects, and the mechanism outputs a random allocation of objects. They prove an impossibility result: there is no strategy-proof mechanism satisfying certain efficiency and fairness criteria-specifically, ordinal efficiency and equal treatment of equals. A large subsequent literature has studied similar random matching problems, spurred partly by applications to school choice; see, e.g., Erdil (2014) , Katta and Sethuraman (2006) , Pycia and Ünver (2015) . Gabriel Carroll: gdc@stanford.edu Thanks to (in random order) Juuso Toikka, Alex Wolitzky, Muhamet Yildiz, Yuichiro Kamada, Bengt Holmström, and Daron Acemoglu, and especially to Parag Pathak, for helpful discussions and advice. Suggestions from a co-editor and three referees also improved the paper. Dan Walton provided valuable research assistance.
• Random mechanisms for voting problems have been studied since Gibbard (1977) , who considered agents reporting strict rankings over a finite set of outcomes and a mechanism choosing a lottery over the outcomes. Gibbard showed that any strategy-proof voting mechanism can be decomposed as a randomization over components that either are dictatorial or have a range of size two. Gibbard considered the unrestricted preference domain. Recent years have seen a surge of similar work on other preference domains, with both possibility and impossibility results. For example, Chatterji et al. (2014) give broad connectedness-type conditions on a domain that imply every strategy-proof and unanimous mechanism is a random dictatorship. They also show by example that domain conditions known to imply dictatorship results in the deterministic setting are not sufficient in the randomized setting. Other work in this vein includes Ehlers et al. (2002) , Chatterji et al. (2016) , Peters et al. (2014) , Chatterji and Zeng (2018) .
• Randomization has also been studied in rationing problems (Ehlers 2002, Ehlers and Klaus 2003) .
Randomization is typically motivated by fairness concerns-for example, in school choice, lotteries can break ties to determine who gets a spot at a highly coveted school (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2005, Pathak and Sethuraman 2011)-although (as we shall see) it can also be helpful for incentives.
A key assumption throughout this literature is that agents can only report ordinal preference information (and the mechanism should provide incentives to do so truthfully). This assumption is usually justified by an informal appeal to simplicity (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) : it may be relatively easy for agents to express a preference ranking over pure outcomes, but harder to think about their own preferences over lotteries.
Still, we can easily think of mechanisms where agents are forced to make a choice between lotteries; ruling out such mechanisms is a substantive restriction. Indeed, another branch of school choice literature has emphasized the possible gains from mechanisms that elicit information about cardinal preferences (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011 , Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2015 , Pycia 2014 , Troyan 2012 ). So we ask, "Is it possible to give a firm theoretical justification for only considering ordinal mechanisms?" It is clear that if a social planner evaluates outcomes by a cardinal criterion (say, utilitarian welfare), then she should elicit cardinal preference information. In this paper, we therefore narrow down the question as follows: Suppose that the planner has a goal that only depends on agents' ordinal preferences. Might it nonetheless happen that, for incentive reasons, she can implement her goal only by having agents make choices that depend on cardinal preferences? Alternatively, is it indeed without loss of generality to assume an ordinal mechanism?
To set the stage, we give a simple example of how the restriction to ordinal mechanisms can matter, even if the planner's goals depend only on ordinal preferences. Example 1. Suppose there is just one agent, and four possible outcomes a, b, c, and d. Assume the agent evaluates lotteries by expected utility. The agent's ranking of pure outcomes is known to fall under one of three possible ordinal types t, t , and t , which rank the outcomes as shown in Table 1 . As shown, if the agent's ordinal type is t, we assume the planner wishes to implement the lottery over outcomes 1 2 a + 1 2 d. If the agent's type is t , the planner wishes to choose lottery 1 2 b + 1 2 c, and if the agent's type is t , the planner is content with either of these two lotteries. (For brevity, we are just assuming the planner exogenously has these objectives; if we wished, we could "microfound" them in terms of fairness and efficiency criteria by introducing additional agents.)
Evidently, the planner's goal is a function only of the agent's ordinal preferences, and the goal can be achieved by simply asking the agent to choose between the two lotteries 1 2 a + 1 2 d and 1 2 b + 1 2 c. But if the planner is restricted to use a direct mechanism that asks the agent to report his ordinal preferences, she is out of luck: Either the mechanism must specify that type t gets lottery 1 2 a + 1 2 d or that he gets 1 2 b + 1 2 c. In each case, the mechanism fails to provide incentives to report truthfully; there will be at least some cardinal preferences consistent with type t for which the agent will prefer to misreport his type as t or t . ♦ This example shows that, without further assumptions, it is not without loss of generality to restrict to ordinal mechanisms.
The main contribution of the present paper is a formal framework in which the restriction is without loss of generality. As in the example, our planner who has some goals that depend on agents' ordinal preferences (represented by a social choice correspondence (SCC), specifying the acceptable outcome lotteries for each preference profile). She wishes to know whether it is possible to implement her goals. This setting embeds concrete applications of interest. We return to our opening examples.
• In the object allocation problem of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) , the requirements of ordinal efficiency and equal treatment of equals can be expressed by an SCC that, at each profile of ordinal preferences, deems a lottery over allocations to be acceptable if and only if it is consistent with these requirements.
• In a voting problem, unanimity can be expressed by the SCC where, at any profile where all voters have the same preferred outcome, only the degenerate lottery on that outcome is acceptable, and at any other preferences, all lotteries are acceptable.
Since our framework is specifically focused on possibility/impossibility results, it does not capture characterizations such as the random dictatorship result of Chatterji et al. (2014) . However, one could refine the SCC so as to rule out random dictatorship (for example, by imposing a "compromise" requirement as in Chatterji et al. (2016) , specifying that at some particular profiles, an outcome that is not anyone's top choice should be chosen with some minimum probability). Then the result of Chatterji et al. (2014) translates into an impossibility theorem, which fits within our framework.
Our planner can consider her problem in two ways. She can ask whether her goals are implementable by some mechanism. She can also ask specifically whether they can be implemented by an ordinal mechanism. When the answers to these two questions are equivalent, the planner is justified in restricting her attention to ordinal mechanisms. We then say that there is a foundation for ordinal mechanisms.
Our main result, Theorem 1, gives such a foundation, showing that the planner can implement her goals in a way that is sufficiently robust to uncertainty about cardinal preferences only if she can implement them using an ordinal mechanism. At the same time, a series of examples illustrates the limits of the argument.
A crucial ingredient in this foundation is interdependence in cardinal preferences: while each agent knows his own ordinal preferences, we allow that his preferences over lotteries might depend on other agents' private information. While the introduction of interdependence may appear surprising, there are two arguments for why it is reasonable, as we elaborate in Section 4. First, it arises naturally if we attempt to model agents not perfectly knowing their own cardinal preferences: this uncertainty may be correlated with others' preferences, generating interdependence. Second, it is realistic to suppose that some modest amount of interdependence exists in applications. Our foundation in fact applies even if the amount of interdependence is restricted to be arbitrarily small, as long as it is nonzero.
We use ex post implementation (Bergemann and Morris 2005 , Chung and Ely 2006 , Jehiel et al. 2006 ) as our solution concept. This is motivated by the existing literature on probabilistic mechanism design with ordinal preferences (such as that cited above), which typically requires mechanisms to be strategy-proof; i.e., reporting truthfully should be a dominant strategy for each agent i and all von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions consistent with i's ordinal preferences. The restriction to dominant-strategy mechanisms has been critiqued elsewhere, in an influential paper by Bergemann and Morris (2005) (which we discuss further momentarily), but it is not our focus here. So we simply follow the relevant literature and retain this solution concept; adapting it for interdependent preferences leads us to ex post implementation. 1 A limitation of our Theorem 1 is that it only applies when ordinal preferences over pure outcomes are strict. This means that while the theorem applies to the voting example above, it does not apply (for example) to matching settings, where each agent is indifferent among all allocations that gave him the same object.
This limitation can be overcome if we expand our model further. Specifically, we note that ordinal mechanisms are not only robust to arbitrary cardinal preferences, but remain robust even if agents' preferences over lotteries are not represented by expected utility at all. This leads us to consider a planner who wants to accommodate agents with non-expected-utility preferences. We can then give a foundation for ordinal mechanisms without assuming strict preferences, either when preferences over lotteries are unrestricted (Theorem 2) or when they fall within any of several commonly studied nonexpected-utility models (Theorem 3). Interdependence is still needed.
A quick overview of the paper is as follows. Example 1 above illustrates the basic challenge in looking for foundations for ordinal mechanisms. After we set up the general framework in Section 2, we first consider one possible response to the challenge: to try to give a foundation for ordinal mechanisms by restricting the SCCs under consideration. Section 3 proposes one natural restriction, and offers examples to show how the restriction does not help in general. This motivates the alternative response, of strengthening the robustness requirement by allowing interdependence in cardinal preferences. In Section 4, we give the main result (Theorem 1), the foundation for ordinal mechanisms with interdependence when preferences are strict. In Section 5, we proceed to allow non-expected utility, and give the foundations for ordinal mechanisms without strict preferences (Theorems 2 and 3). After briefly discussing extensions, in the concluding section, we discuss some more general issues.
This paper owes a methodological debt to the work of Bergemann and Morris (2005) . They studied the question of whether implementability of an SCC using a mechanism in which agents' beliefs play no role (i.e., ex post implementation) is equivalent to implementability over all possible belief hierarchies. Analogously, we ask here whether implementability using a mechanism in which cardinal preferences play no role is equivalent to implementability for all possible cardinal preferences.
Our Theorem 1 also is reminiscent of the result of Jehiel et al. (2006) . They consider ex post implementation in a setting with interdependent preferences and monetary transfers with quasilinear utility. Like this paper, theirs shows that implementation is typically not possible unless it is possible for a trivial reason: in their paper, the trivial case is a constant mechanism. Their paper and this one differ both in the setting and in the breadth of the class of SCCs considered. It does not seem that our result follows from that of Jehiel et al. (2006) or vice versa.
One other closely related paper is by Ehlers et al. (2016) . That paper, independent of the present work, also seeks justification for ordinal mechanisms. It considers mechanisms defined over all possible cardinal preferences consistent with a given domain of (strict) ordinal preferences, and shows that if an incentive-compatible mechanism satisfies a uniform continuity condition within each ordinal type, it must actually be an ordinal mechanism. The uniform continuity hypothesis imposed there is a strong requirement: indeed, if it were required across all cardinal preferences of a given agent, rather than just cardinal preferences with the same ordinal preference, the mechanism would have to be constant.
Finally, this paper ties in with the broader topic of deciding what message spaces are appropriate when designing a mechanism-an issue that has recently gained prominence in market design practice (Milgrom 2011) . The paper is written with a focus on ordinal versus cardinal preference information, but, in fact, the same methods can be applied more generally to other kinds of preference information to ask when such information can be safely excluded from the message space by a mechanism designer who does not directly care about it. (This is discussed further in Section 6.1.)
The modeling framework
We now introduce the necessary definitions to lay out the formal framework and state the main result, Theorem 1. Definitions needed for other results and extensions, including the material on non-expected utility in Section 5, are introduced later as needed.
We assume a set N = {1 n} of agents and a finite set X of outcomes are given. In a voting context, outcomes might correspond to candidates or policies; in a matching context, each element of X would be a possible matching. We write (X) for the space of lotteries over X, and write π(x) for the probability of outcome x under lottery π.
An ordinal type space for agent i is a set T i , where each t i ∈ T i is a weak ordering (i.e., a complete, transitive ordering) over X. An element t i ∈ T i is called an ordinal type. We write x t i y to indicate that t i ranks x weakly above y, and write x t i y and x ∼ t i y similarly. We also use the term ordinal type space for the product T = T 1 × · · · × T n . The definition implicitly imposes that different types must have different preference orderings; this is not a substantive restriction. We write T −i = × j =i T j . We say that types are strict if, for all t i and all distinct x y ∈ X, x t i y.
Next, we need to describe the goals of the social planner. These goals are represented by a social choice correspondence (SCC). We take as given that the domain of the SCC is the space of ordinal types T . Thus, an SCC is a correspondence F : T ⇒ (X), specifying an acceptable set of lotteries for each type profile t ∈ T . We assume F(t) = ∅ for all t.
We say that F is deterministic if, for each t, F(t) ⊆ X: that is, F only allows degenerate lotteries. We say that F is a social choice function (SCF) if it is single-valued.
Given a planner's goals, as represented by the SCC F , there are two natural ways to ask whether F can be implemented:
(Q1) Can F be implemented by some ordinal mechanism? (Q2) Can F always be implemented by some mechanism, in spite of any uncertainty about agents' preferences over lotteries?
We discuss in a moment how to state these questions formally. But first we comment that in any reasonable modeling framework, an affirmative answer to (Q1) should imply an affirmative answer to (Q2), since the class of mechanisms allowed by (Q1) is a subset of those in (Q2). The general question we wish to answer is the converse: whether an affirmative answer to (Q2) implies an affirmative answer to (Q1). If we can formalize (Q1) and (Q2) in such a way that this converse holds, we will say that we have a foundation for ordinal mechanisms.
To formalize (Q1), we just need to define ordinal mechanisms. Given a ordinal type space T , an ordinal mechanism is a function M : T → (X). We say that M implements F (in dominant strategies) if the following criteria hold:
• For each type profile t, M(t) ∈ F(t).
• For all i and all t i t i ∈ T i and t −i ∈ T −i , the lottery M(t i t −i ) first-order stochastically dominates M(t i t −i ) with respect to the preference ordering t i ; that is, for all
x ∈ X,
One readily checks that the latter condition is equivalent to requiring that every von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function representing t i weakly prefers M(t i t −i ) to M(t i t −i ), and so is the appropriate formulation of dominant-strategy incentive compatibility when agents report ordinal preferences. We say that the mechanism M is deterministic if M(t) is a degenerate lottery for each t. Note that a mechanism M implementing F may be deterministic even if F itself is not deterministic.
To formalize (Q2), the first natural framework to use is one of private values; that is, agents know their own cardinal (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utilities. We then define the relevant spaces of uncertain preferences as follows: An (independent) cardinal type space for agent i is a finite set S i of possible von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions s i : X → R. (Finiteness is again not a substantive restriction.) A type s i ∈ S i represents an ordinal type t i if, for all x y ∈ X, we have s i (x) ≥ s i (y) if and only if x t i y. For a lottery π, we write s i (π) for the expected utility x∈X π(x)s i (x). We say that S i is a cardinal extension of T i if every s i ∈ S i represents some type in T i , and every type in T i is represented by some type in S i .
We say that the cardinal type space S = S 1 × · · · × S n is a cardinal extension of T if S i is a cardinal extension of T i for each i. In this case, we write t i (s i ) for the ordinal type represented by s i , and write t(s) for the profile of ordinal types (t 1 (s 1 ) t n (s n )). The overloaded notation t i (representing both an ordinal type and a function S i → T i ) should not cause any confusion in practice. We also again write S −i = × j =i S j .
We also say that S i is a minimal cardinal extension of T i if each t i ∈ T i is represented by just one s i ∈ S i . Minimal cardinal extensions are the formal analogue in our setting of the payoff type spaces considered by Bergemann and Morris (2005) .
We define a cardinal mechanism over S to be a function M : S → (X). If S is a cardinal extension of T , we can say that M implements F (in dominant strategies) if the following statements hold:
• For each s, M(s) ∈ F(t(s)).
• For all i, s i s i ∈ S i and all s −i ∈ S −i ,
Cardinal mechanisms give more flexibility than ordinal mechanisms, by allowing the chosen lottery M(s) to vary depending on agents' cardinal preferences, even within a fixed profile of ordinal preferences.
The relevant formulation of (Q2) in this framework is then, "Can F be implemented over every cardinal extension of the given type space T ?"
In Example 1, the answer to (Q1) was no, while the answer to (Q2) (as formulated above) was yes.
The above framework shows one way to formalize (Q2). But our main result requires larger spaces of uncertain preferences: it requires a framework in which each agent i is uncertain about his own cardinal preferences, and knowing other agents' types would be informative in resolving this uncertainty. That is, it requires interdependence in cardinal utilities. We give the definitions here, leaving the detailed discussion of interpretation to Section 4.
Define an interdependent cardinal type space to be a pair (S u), whose components are as follows:
• The set S = S 1 × · · · × S n is a product of (finite) sets representing the possible types of the individual agents.
• The object u is a profile of utility functions, u = (u 1 u n ), where each function u i : X ×S → R expresses agent i's utility for each outcome in X, which may depend on all agents' types.
We again extend utilities to lotteries linearly, writing u i (π s) = x∈X π(x)u i (x s), the expected utility of lottery π when the type profile is s.
We say that (S u) is an interdependent cardinal extension of the ordinal type space T if there are surjective functions t i : S i → T i for each i, such that for all type profiles s ∈ S and all agents i, u i (· s) represents the ordinal type t i (s i ). The extension is minimal if each function t i is a bijection.
The appropriate analogue of dominant-strategy implementation when preferences are interdependent is ex post implementation (Chung and Ely 2006) , which requires only that it should be optimal for i to report his type truthfully regardless of the true type profile, as long as other agents are also reporting their types truthfully. Accordingly, when (S u) is an interdependent cardinal extension of T , we define a mechanism over (S u) to be a function M : S → (X), and we say that M implements F (in ex post equilibrium) if the following statements hold:
The statement of (Q2) in this interdependent framework is then, "Can F be implemented over every interdependent cardinal extension of T ?"
Of course, if the answer to (Q2) in the interdependent framework is affirmative, then the answer in the (less demanding) independent framework is also affirmative.
We close the section with a simple observation that helps narrow the focus of our study.
Proposition 1. Suppose that either of the following statements holds:
(a) The SCC F is a social choice function.
If F can be implemented over every (independent) cardinal extension of T , then it can be implemented by an ordinal mechanism. 2 The (straightforward) proof is provided in Appendix A. (Part (a) parallels a similar observation by Bergemann and Morris 2005, their Proposition 2.) Thus, in these two cases, we have a ready foundation for ordinal mechanisms. So the challenge in giving foundations pertains specifically to situations where the SCC F is not single-valued and genuinely involves lotteries.
One more comment about the modeling: since the goal is to give microfoundations by having agents' preferences fully modeled in the type space, why keep dominantstrategy (respectively, ex post) implementation as the solution concept, instead of modeling agents' beliefs about each other as part of the type and using Bayesian implementation? Our main answer, again, is that this critique of ex post implementation has been raised elsewhere-by Bergemann and Morris (2005) as well as others Ely 2007, Yamashita 2015 )-and is not the focus of this paper. We keep ex post so as to concentrate attention on the restriction to ordinal mechanisms. In addition, there does not seem to be a sensible way to incorporate interdependence if we adopt Bayesian implementation; see Section 6.2.
Restricted SCC's and examples
We already saw, in Example 1, that there is no fully general foundation for ordinal mechanisms. A desire for robustness to uncertain cardinal preferences does not immediately justify the use of ordinal mechanisms.
This suggests two possible routes to look for such foundations. The first route is to impose restrictions on the structure of the SCC F . The second is to reformulate (Q2) by requiring robustness to larger spaces of uncertainty.
The rest of this section considers one version of the first route. The approach we take here is not used for our main results later, so it can be skipped on a quick reading; however, this section also develops examples that are referred to again in later exposition. The following section undertakes the second route, by allowing for interdependent preferences.
To rule out the problem encountered in Example 1, we consider restricting the SCC F as follows: for each t, require that F(t) = (Y ) for some Y ⊆ X. Such an F is called simple. This represents a situation in which, for each ordinal type profile, every pure outcome is considered either acceptable or unacceptable, and the planner simply wishes to be sure of an acceptable outcome. Criteria such as unanimity in voting problems or ex post Pareto efficiency in matching problems are expressed by a simple SCC.
Under the requirement of simplicity, there is, in fact, a foundation for ordinal mechanisms with just one agent.
Proposition 2. Suppose n = 1. If the simple SCC F is implementable over every cardinal extension of T 1 , then it is implementable by an ordinal mechanism over T 1 .
The proof involves giving a simple iterative-elimination algorithm that determines whether F is implementable by an ordinal mechanism over T 1 . If not, we can use the execution path of the algorithm to explicitly construct a cardinal extension over which F is not implementable. The details of the proof are given in Appendix A. (In fact, the proof shows a stronger statement: either F is implementable by a deterministic ordinal mechanism or there is a minimal cardinal extension over which it is not implementable.)
Unfortunately, Proposition 2 does not extend beyond the one-agent case.
The intuitive reason is that the simplicity restriction on F loses its bite when there are multiple agents: The interaction between different agents' incentive constraints can force the use of lotteries, even though the definition of F itself does not require it. This fact is illustrated by Example 2 below. Afterward, we show how this idea can be developed into a counterexample to Proposition 2 with multiple agents.
Example 2. Let X consist of eight outcomes {a b c d e f g h}, and let there be two agents, each with two ordinal types. Let the preferences of the types be
We claim that this is the only ordinal mechanism implementing F . Indeed, let M be such a mechanism. Consider the total probability of obtaining outcomes weakly preferred to f by type t 1 (namely b, f ) at each of the profiles (t 1 t 2 ) and (t 1 t 2 ). The incentive constraint of type t 1 gives
Since F prohibits M from placing positive probability on f at (t 1 t 2 ) or on b at (t 1 t 2 ), we obtain more simply M(t 1 t 2 )(b) ≥ M(t 1 t 2 )(f ). We summarize the above reasoning as
Using the other incentive constraints for each agent, we similarly obtain the inequalities
This cycle of eight inequalities immediately means that all the probabilities involved must be equal; thus, they are all equal to 1/2, and the mechanism M is uniquely determined, as claimed. ♦ Now, we are ready to see how, even with the restriction to simple SCCs, we do not have a foundation for ordinal mechanisms in general: Example 3 gives a simple SCC that can be implemented over every cardinal extension, but not implemented by an ordinal mechanism. It draws on the construction from Example 2 to ensure that any ordinal mechanism would need to use lotteries; once this door is opened, we can then use the idea of Example 1 to force one agent to choose among lotteries in a way that depends on cardinal preferences. Now consider the possible values for the lottery M(t 1 t 2 t 3 ). Fix the types of the first two agents at (t 1 t 2 ). We must have M(t 1 t 2 t 3 )(a) ≥ 1 2 or else type t 3 would have a potential incentive to imitate t 3 . However, M(t 1 t 2 t 3 )(a) + M(t 1 t 2 t 3 )(a ) ≤ 1 2 or else the incentive constraint of type t 3 would be violated, and M(t 1 t 2 t 3 )(a) + M(t 1 t 2 t 3 )(b ) ≤ 1 2 or else the incentive constraint of type t 3 would be violated. These inequalities imply that M(t 1 t 2 t 3 ) puts probability 1 2 on a, and probability 0 on a and b . The remaining probability 1 2 must go to b. But this gives t 3 an incentive to imitate t 3 , and we reach a contradiction.
Thus our F cannot be implemented by an ordinal mechanism. Nonetheless, it can be implemented over any cardinal extension of the type space T as follows. If agent 3's preferences correspond to ordinal type t 3 or t 3 , then execute the 1 2 − 1 2 lottery given by the agents' ordinal preference types, as above. Otherwise, the outcome is given by
Here the interpretation of the "or" is that if the ordinal types are (t 1 t 2 t 3 ), the mechanism prescribes whichever of the two indicated lotteries is preferred by agent 3a choice that depends on 3's cardinal preferences. ♦
Foundations with interdependent preferences
We now take the second route described at the beginning of Section 3: we enlarge the space of uncertainty by allowing agents' cardinal preferences to be interdependent. In this framework, we can give a foundation for ordinal mechanisms. This is our main result. We also present some examples that show the role of various hypotheses. Modeling issues are discussed afterward in Section 4.2.
Formal results
When there is only one agent, interdependence buys us nothing; hence, we had better assume n ≥ 2 agents. In this case, we can indeed obtain a foundation for ordinal mechanisms. The only assumption we need to make about F is that it is closed-valued. However, we do need to assume that the agents' ordinal preferences over pure outcomes are strict.
Theorem 1. Suppose n ≥ 2 and that T is an ordinal type space in which all agents' types are strict. Let F : T ⇒ (X) be an SCC with F(t) closed for each t ∈ T . If F is implementable over every interdependent cardinal extension of T , then it is implementable by an ordinal mechanism over T .
We sketch the proof here by presenting the argument in the case of two agents and three outcomes. The full proof uses similar ideas, but is more notationally involved and is left to Appendix A. 3
Proof of Theorem 1: Sketch ( Two agents, three outcomes). For any > 0, say that the ordinal mechanism M : T → (X) -implements F over T if the following statements hold:
• For each t ∈ T , M(t) ∈ F(t). and
Fix . We construct an interdependent cardinal extension S of T , such that if F is implementable over S, then F is -implementable by an ordinal mechanism. Exact implementability then follows by a limiting argument taking → 0 (and using the fact that F(t) is closed).
As a matter of notation, we identify utility functions with elements of the vector space R 3 ; note that expected utility for a lottery u(π) is then given by the inner product u · π. s 2 s 2 Figure 1 . Basic building block for the interdependent type space.
The basic building block of the construction is shown in Figure 1 . Here s 1 and s 1 are two cardinal types that represent the same ordinal type t 1 of agent 1. We take u 1 u 1 : X → R to be any two different utility functions that represent this type, and similarly for agent 2. We also consider an arbitrary w ∈ R 3 , close enough to 0 so that u 1 − w still represents t 1 and u 2 + w still represents t 2 . (This holds whenever w is small enough, since types are strict.) Then at the three interdependent cardinal type profiles (s 1 s 2 ), (s 1 s 2 ), and (s 1 s 2 ), we specify cardinal preferences over X for the two agents as indicated. At (s 1 s 2 ), the cardinal preferences may be arbitrary.
Suppose a mechanism M implements F over an interdependent cardinal extension that contains this building block. There are two ex post incentive constraints for agent 2 when agent 1's type is s 1 : one for s 2 to imitate s 2 and one for s 2 to imitate s 2 . These give
Subtracting these inequalities gives w · (M(s 1 s 2 ) − M(s 1 s 2 )) ≥ 0. A similar calculation using agent 1's incentive constraints gives w · (M(s 1 s 2 ) − M(s 1 s 2 )) ≥ 0. Combining gives w · (M(s 1 s 2 ) − M(s 1 s 2 )) ≥ 0. The next step of the construction is to combine several of these blocks into the staircase shape in Figure 2 . For each agent i = 1 2, we now start from seven arbitrary utility functions u 1 i u 7 i that all represent the same t i . We also take three vectors
where, as before, δ > 0 is small enough so that each u j i ± w d represents t i . To form the staircase, we define seven cardinal types s 1 i s 7 i for each agent i and specify cardinal preferences as indicated in the figure. Again, for the cells left blank, we can specify any cardinal preferences as long as they are consistent with the ordinal types t 1 and t 2 .
Suppose that a mechanism M implements F over an extension in which this staircase appears. Notice that for each k = 1 6, the types s k 1 and s k+1 1 for agent 1, and s k 2 and s k+1 2 for agent 2 form a building block as in Figure 1 . Using this block, we conclude that w 1 · (M(s k+1 1 s k+1
2 ) − M(s k 1 s k 2 )) ≥ 0. Adding together these inequalities for each k = 1 6 gives
Now, for each k, the types s k 1 , s k+2 1 and s k 2 , s k+2 2 also form a building block, with perturbation w 2 rather than w 
Similarly, types s k 1 , s k+3 1 and s k 2 , s k+3 2 form a building block with perturbation w 3 , from which (taking k = 1 4 and adding)
Adding (2), (3), and (4) gives 0 ≥ 0. So all three of them must be equalities: the vector M(s 7 1 s 7 2 ) − M(s 1 1 s 1 2 ) is orthogonal to w 1 , w 2 , and w 3 . It is also orthogonal to (1 1 1), since it is the difference of two lotteries. Thus, M(s 7 1 s 7 2 ) − M(s 1 1 s 1 2 ) is orthogonal to all of R 3 , so it must be zero. We conclude that
Now we are ready to construct a full-fledged interdependent cardinal extension S. For each agent i and each t i ∈ T i , define seven corresponding cardinal types s 1 i (t i ) s 7 i (t i ). Each ordinal type profile in T thus gives rise to 49 cardinal type profiles in S, and we fill in the cardinal preferences as in Figure 2 . Since the cardinal utilities u j i there were arbitrary, we can add the following stipulations for each t i : This specifies S. (Again, blank cells can be filled in freely.) Now, by hypothesis, F can be implemented over S by a mechanism M. In view of the above analysis, and specifically (5), we can define an ordinal mechanism M : T → (X) by
Our goal is to show that M -implements F over T . But the ordinal incentive constraints (1) for M just follow from the cardinal incentive constraints for M: Indeed, consider any (t 1 t 2 ) ∈ T and any possible deviation t 1 for agent 1. The cardinal incentive constraint at type profile (s 1 1 (t 1 ) s 1 2 (t 2 )), which specifies that agent 1 does not want to deviate to s 1 1 (t 1 ) in M, implies that in M , the probability of getting the top-ranked outcome cannot increase by more than if 1 misreports t 1 . Similarly, the cardinal incentive constraint at type profile (s 7 1 (t 1 ) s 7 2 (t 2 )), guarding against misreport s 7 1 (t 1 ) in M, implies that in M , the probability of getting one of the two top outcomes cannot increase by more than under the misreport t 1 . Together, these constraints constitute the ordinal incentive constraints (1) for agent 1 in M , and similarly for agent 2.
Thus, M -implements F over T . By a limiting argument (detailed in the full proof ), we find that F can be exactly implemented over T .
The key to the argument is the staircase construction that forces M to be equal across cardinal type profiles with different cardinal utility functions, as indicated by (5). This makes it possible to replicate all of the ( -) ordinal incentive constraints within the cardinal type space. Of course, this construction leans heavily on the fact that we have allowed interdependence. Without interdependence, we could not construct the staircase as in Figure 2 , since agent 1's utility function over X would have to be the same across all cells in any given row, and 2's utility would have to be the same across all cells in any given column.
We next give a couple of examples to show that various hypotheses in Theorem 1 cannot be dropped.
Example 4 (Hypothesis of strict preferences). If we allow for weak preferences, then Theorem 1 does not hold in general. The reason why the proof technique depends on strict preferences can be seen in the sketch above: we need to be able to choose the perturbations w d to be rich enough so that orthogonality conditions (2)-(4) imply equality (5), while also ensuring that all of the functions u j i ± w d still represent the ordinal type t i . To see that the result fails with weak preferences, revisit Example 3, but modify the preferences of agents 1 and 2 by having them be indifferent between a and a , and indifferent between b and b . Leave the preferences of agent 3 and the SCC F as before.
Once again, F cannot be implemented by an ordinal mechanism (nothing in the original argument depended on 1's or 2's preferences between a and a or between b and b ). However, for any interdependent cardinal extension S of T , we can implement F using the same mechanism as in the original example:
• If agent 3 has ordinal type t 3 or t 3 , prescribe the 1 2 − 1 2 lottery between the allowed outcomes.
• If 3's ordinal type is t 3 and the other agents' ordinal types are not (t 1 t 2 ), then prescribe outcome m.
• Finally, if the agents have some interdependent cardinal types (s 1 s 2 s 3 ) corresponding to ordinal types (t 1 t 2 t 3 ), then choose whichever of the two lotteries 1 2 a + 1 2 b or 1 2 a + 1 2 b is preferred by the utility function u 3 (· s 1 s 2 s 3 ).
This mechanism would not have worked with the original, strict preferences of Example 3. Under those preferences, when the ordinal type profile is (t 1 t 2 t 3 ), agent 3 is supposed to get whichever of the two lotteries 1 2 a + 1 2 b or 1 2 a + 1 2 b he prefers, and this preference depends on 1's and 2's cardinal types. Hence agents 1 and 2 would have incentives to lie about their types so as to influence the choice between these two lotteries. However, in the present example, with agents 1 and 2 indifferent between a and a and between b and b , these incentives are eliminated. ♦
The finding of this example-that the hypothesis of strict preferences in Theorem 1 cannot be abandoned-limits the theorem's applicability. As previewed in the Introduction, the strictness requirement is satisfied in voting problems such as Chatterji et al. (2014) , but not in other applications such as matching. Later, in Section 5, we are able to drop the strictness requirement by relaxing the assumption of expected utility.
Example 5 (Hypothesis that F is closed-valued). The hypothesis that F should be closed-valued cannot be dispensed with. For example, let X = {a b c}, n = 2, and let there be two types of agent 1 and a single type of agent 2. Let the preferences of the agents' types and the set of lotteries allowed by F at each type profile be
This F cannot be implemented by an ordinal mechanism, since no lottery αa + (1 − α)c with α < 1 stochastically dominates b with respect to the ordinal type t 1 . But for any interdependent cardinal type space S, we can implement F over S by the mechanism that chooses α * a + (1 − α * )c whenever agent 1 has ordinal type t 1 and chooses b whenever 1 has ordinal type t 1 , for some fixed α * . As long as α * is chosen sufficiently close to 1, then α * a + (1 − α * )c is preferred over b by the utility function u 1 (· s) at every cardinal type profile s with t(s) = (t 1 t 2 ) and, hence, the incentive constraints are satisfied.
This example depends on our restriction that type spaces should be finite. Indeed, if we allow interdependent cardinal type spaces to be infinite, then we can do away with the closed-valued hypothesis; the proof is a straightforward extension of the construction used to prove Theorem 1. ♦ Example 6 (It is not enough to consider minimal extensions). If we only assume that F is implementable over every minimal interdependent cardinal extension, then the conclusion of Theorem 1 does not follow. Indeed, consider once again the ordinal type space T and SCC F from Example 3. For any minimal interdependent cardinal extension S of T , we can implement F over S using the same mechanism as was given in that example: in the particular case where the type profile is (s 1 s 2 s 3 ), corresponding to ordinal types (t 1 t 2 t 3 ), we simply choose whichever of the two lotteries 1 2 a + 1 2 b or 1 2 a + 1 2 b is preferred by the utility function u 3 (· s 1 s 2 s 3 ). However, as we saw in Example 3, this F cannot be implemented by an ordinal mechanism. Thus, allowing "large" spaces of interdependent cardinal types is necessary to obtain the foundation for ordinal mechanisms. ♦
Interpretation
At this point, we can return to discuss modeling issues. The introduction of interdependence might seem to come out of nowhere, particularly since the original ordinal framework ((Q1) in Section 2) does not assume interdependence. We offer several arguments for why interdependence is actually natural in this setting.
• The first reason goes back to the original informal justification in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) for using ordinal mechanisms: it is difficult for people to figure out their own preferences over lotteries. The natural theoretical tool to express this idea would be a model in which agents know their own ordinal preferences but face uncertainty over their cardinal preferences u i . In such a model, each agent i actually faces two sources of uncertainty: his own utility function and the types of the other agents. There is no a priori reason to restrict these sources of uncertainty to be independent. Allowing for correlation leads in effect to interdependent preferences.
• A second, related argument for interdependence is practical: Virtually all reallife applications do involve common values to some extent: each agent i may have some uncertainty about fundamentals that genuinely does lead to correlation between i's preferences and other agents' information. In a voting scenario, for example, we might imagine that voter i's evaluation of each candidate x equals u i (x) + v i ( x ), where u i (x) represents preferences over salient policy dimensions,
x represents less-important dimensions about which the voter is imperfectly informed, and v i ( x ) represents i's preferences over these dimensions; we assume the uncertainty in x is small enough so as not to affect i's ordinal ranking of candidates. Voter i observes u i (x) and some noisy signal σ i x of x . Then i's cardinal type is represented by the vector of signals σ i , and i evaluates each candidate x by u i (x) + E[v i ( x ) | σ 1 σ n ]; thus, we have interdependence. We could tell a similar story in school choice scenarios or other applications.
From this point of view, the usual modeling approach, in which agents know their own preferences, simply reflects a presumption that any such interdependence is of second-order importance, so that modeling preferences as independent is a good approximation. However, we can incorporate this idea explicitly in our framework by requiring that the amount of interdependence should be small relative to agents' certainty about their preferences, and then Theorem 1 still goes through.
Here is a formalization. Let T be an ordinal type space and let S be an interdependent cardinal extension. Fix > 0. Say that S is an -interdependent extension if the following statements hold: -For all s ∈ S, all agents i, and all x y ∈ X with x t i (s i ) y, we have u i (x s) > u i (y s) + 1 -For all i and s i ∈ S i , and all s −i s −i ∈ S −i and all outcomes x ∈ X,
If we revise the hypothesis of Theorem 1 to say that F is implementable over every -interdependent cardinal extension of T , rather than every interdependent cardinal extension, the conclusion still follows. This can be shown by a straightforward, if tedious, elaboration of the original proof (we omit the details for brevity). Thus, we can interpret this version of Theorem 1 as saying that if a planner is able to implement F in a way that is robust to unknown cardinal preferences and any sufficiently small amount of cardinal interdependence, then it must be possible to achieve her goals using an ordinal mechanism.
• In addition, we point out that it is not really necessary to have the interdependence suddenly introduced at the cardinal-preference level of modeling, that is, (Q2) of Section 2. Instead, we could equally well allow for interdependence in both (Q1) and (Q2). In this case, an ordinal type space would consist of an abstract (finite) set T = × i T i , together with a weak ordering i t over X for each agent i at each profile t ∈ T ; the incentive constraints for a ordinal mechanism M : T → (X) would then require
for all i, t i , t i , and t −i , and all x. The definition of an interdependent cardinal extension would then be changed simply by specifying that u i (· s) should represent the ordinal preference i t(s) for each agent i and cardinal type profile s. With these definitions, Theorem 1 and its proof would go through almost unchanged. The version where there is no interdependence at the ordinal level would then be just a special case, which happens to include the applications highlighted in the Introduction and, indeed, all of the applications studied in existing literature.
Non-expected utility
Ordinal mechanisms have another strength that we have so far not exploited: Not only are they robust to unknown cardinal utilities; they are robust to the possibility that agents might not even evaluate lotteries according to expected utility theory at all. Indeed, although expected utility is orthodox in economic theory, a large body of evidence indicates that it is not always descriptive of real-world decision-makers' behavior. (See Starmer 2000 or Machina 2008 for reviews of this evidence.) To the extent that robust mechanism design aims to understand what mechanisms work well in practice, this seems an important consideration in favor of ordinal mechanisms.
To be more precise, suppose M is an ordinal mechanism implementing some SCC F . Then as long as agent i has preferences over lotteries that respect stochastic dominance (that is, if lottery π weakly first-order stochastically dominates π with respect to ordering t i , then he weakly prefers π over π ), he has no incentive to misreport his type. This is true even if these preferences over lotteries are not described by expected utility.
This suggests we should formulate (Q2) by allowing our "uncertainty about agents' preferences over lotteries" to include non-expected utility (non-EU) preferences. This is a more demanding robustness requirement than simply asking for robustness to all cardinal utility functions. We might then hope that this requirement is strong enough to imply implementation in an ordinal mechanism, thus offering an alternative foundation for ordinal mechanisms.
To investigate this then, we repeat all of our earlier analysis with a more general representation of preferences. It turns out that without interdependent preferences, the main lessons of Section 3 still go through. With interdependent preferences, however, we can give a foundation for ordinal mechanisms that is stronger than before, and we can even do so while remaining within any of several specific models of preferences that are prominent in non-EU literature.
Non-expected utility without interdependence
Let us first consider the case of independent preferences. A non-EU type space 4 is now a space S = S 1 ×· · ·×S n , where each S i is a finite set of continuous functions s i : (X) → R, used to evaluate lotteries over X. Space S is a non-EU extension of T if, for each i, there is a surjective function t i : S i → T i such that each s i is consistent with t i (s i ) in the sense that whenever lottery π weakly stochastically dominates π with respect to the ordering t i (s i ), then s i (π) ≥ s i π This is the stochastic dominance condition. It is stronger than only requiring that s i ranks degenerate lotteries according to t i (s i ).
Let M : S → (X) be a mechanism, with M(s) ∈ F(t(s)) for all s. There are several ways to formulate the dominant-strategy incentive constraint. 5 We can say that 4 This may be a misnomer since it includes EU preferences as a special case, but we keep this name for brevity. 5 Existing literature on mechanism design with non-EU preferences takes varying approaches: Lopomo et al. (2014) require that there be no incentive to deviate to a mixed strategy; thus their "optimal incentive compatibility" corresponds to our "very strong implementation" below. 
However, this only ensures that truth-telling is a dominant strategy if i is certain about the types of his opponents. If we wish to allow arbitrary uncertainty about their types, then a more appropriate constraint is that for any probability distribution σ −i on S −i ,
where M(s i σ −i ) denotes the lottery over outcomes x that results when s −i is distributed according to σ −i and then x is chosen by M(s i s −i ) conditional on s −i . If this constraint is satisfied, we say that M strongly implements F . With expected utility, weak implementation implies strong implementation, but with non-expected utility, this is no longer the case.
Finally, to rule out the possibility of deviations to a mixed strategy randomization by i, we can require that for all i and s i , and all distributions σ −i over S −i and σ i over S i ,
is the distribution over outcomes that results from drawing type reports of i and −i independently from σ i and σ −i . If this condition is satisfied, we say that M very strongly implements F .
If F is implementable over T by an ordinal mechanism M, then for any non-EU extension S of T , F is very strongly implemented over S by the mechanism s → M(t(s)). So we are interested in the converse question: if F is implementable (in some appropriate form) over every non-EU extension S of T , must F be implementable in an ordinal mechanism? If so, we can again say that we have obtained a foundation for ordinal mechanisms.
The answer is no, for basically the same reasons as in the expected-utility case. Example 1 goes through as before as long as our concept of implementation over a non-EU extension is weak or strong implementation. With very strong implementation, the example as written does not go through: the F there is not very strongly implementable over every non-EU extension, since some type may strictly prefer the randomization 1 4 a + 1 4 b + 1 4 c + 1 4 d over both 1 2 a + 1 2 d and 1 2 b + 1 2 c. However, the example can be modified to satisfy very strong implementability as well: see Example 7 in Appendix A.
As in Section 3, we could try to restrict F to be simple. With one agent, this does give a foundation for ordinal mechanisms: Proposition 2 goes through with no trouble, since the expected-utility cardinal extensions used there are just a special case of non-EU extensions. However, with multiple agents, we again run into trouble. Example 3 suffices to show this if we use weak implementation. With strong or very strong implementation, a modification is needed. Example 8 in Appendix A shows how to do this. The SCC there can be very strongly implemented over every non-EU extension of the type space, but cannot be implemented by an ordinal mechanism. We also note that all preferences in that example are strict.
Thus the conclusions of Section 3 still hold when we allow more general preferences over lotteries.
Non-expected utility with interdependence
What if we allow both interdependence and general preferences over lotteries?
The first question is how to formulate preferences in this very general case. In the interdependent framework with expected utility, each type s i of agent i had a cardinal utility defined on X × S −i ; the outcome and the other agents' types could interact in i's preference. So the natural analogue without expected utility is to define s i 's preferences over (X × S −i ). (We need not include S i , since i's type is fixed from his point of view.)
Thus, we define an interdependent non-EU type space to be a pair (S u), whose components are as follows:
• The set S = S 1 × · · · × S n is a product of finite sets, the type spaces for each agent.
• The object u is a collection of utility functions over lotteries, one for each type s i of each agent i, with each u s i being a continuous function (X × S −i ) → R.
We say that (S u) is an interdependent non-EU extension of T if there are surjective functions t i : S i → T i such that each u s i respects stochastic dominance with respect to the weak partial order on X × S −i , given by
When (S u) is an interdependent non-EU extension of T and when M : S → (X) is any mechanism, we define M −i (s i s −i ) for each agent i to be the distribution over X × S −i that puts marginal probability 1 on type profile s −i and has outcomes distributed according to M(s i s −i ). More generally, if σ −i is a distribution over S −i , we define M −i (s i σ −i ) to be the distribution over X × S −i , where s −i is marginally distributed according to σ −i and, conditional on s −i , x is distributed according to M(s i s −i ).
If the mechanism M satisfies M(s) ∈ F(t(s)) for all s, we can say that M weakly implements F (in ex post equilibrium) if, for all i, s i , s i , and s −i , the inequality F (in ex post equilibrium) if, for all i, s i , and s i , and all distributions σ −i over S −i , we have
We could further define very strong implementation, but it is not necessary to do so here.)
If we only require weak implementation over non-EU extensions, then the full preferences over lotteries of each type s i are not needed: all that matters is the induced preference over (X) for each fixed s −i . In this case, Theorem 1 carries over (since EU extensions are a special case of non-EU extensions), so we have a foundation for ordinal mechanisms as long as ordinal types are strict. But we still cannot drop the assumption of strictness: Example 4 also goes through, showing that when indifferences are allowed, then weak implementation over every interdependent non-EU extension does not imply implementation in an ordinal mechanism.
However, if we strengthen our implementation concept to strong implementation, then we can give a foundation without any strictness requirement on ordinal preferences.
Theorem 2. Suppose n ≥ 2, and T is any ordinal type space. Let F : T ⇒ (X) be an SCC with F(t) closed for each t ∈ T . If F is strongly implementable over every interdependent non-EU extension of T , then it is implementable by an ordinal mechanism over T .
(Rather than give a proof, we obtain Theorem 2 as an immediate consequence of Theorem 3 below.)
The statement of Theorem 2 is general, but somewhat unsatisfactory: it requires an extremely strong hypothesis, namely implementability for all interdependent non-EU preferences, which is a large class. We might reasonably ask what happens if the preferences are restricted to some specific class (ideally one motivated by psychological evidence), i.e., whether robustness to some particular non-EU preferences is enough for a foundation for ordinal mechanisms. There have been many such specific non-EU models studied in the literature. We content ourselves to examine a particularly prominent one here: the quadratic rank-dependent utility model.
Suppose that Y is an arbitrary finite set, that u : Y → R is a cardinal utility function, and that λ ∈ [0 1] is a parameter. We define a preference over (Y ) as follows. Order the elements of Y as y 1 y r such that u(y 1 ) ≤ · · · ≤ u(y r ). Then for any π ∈ (Y ), define u(π) = r j=1 g λ k≤j π(y k ) − g λ k<j π(y k ) u(y j )
where
Thus, lotteries are evaluated with cumulative probabilities distorted according to the increasing quadratic function g λ . (Note that if u assigns equal utility to several elements of Y , then there is an indeterminacy in labeling these elements, but this does not affect the value of u(π).) We say that u : (Y ) → R is a quadratic rank-dependent utility (QRDU) function if it has a representation of the above form for some u and λ. Note that any such preference over lotteries respects stochastic dominance with respect to the ordering on Y implied by u. This form of preferences over lotteries was studied recently by Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016) , who showed that it is nested in several classes of models that have figured prominently in the non-EU literature. In particular, it lies within the rank-dependent utility class of models (Quiggin 1982 , Wakker 1994 , Abdellaoui 2002 , as well as the quadratic utility class (Chew et al. 1991) . Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016) showed that with a continuous outcome space, QRDU is in fact the intersection of these two classes. Moreover, they also showed that it is equivalent to a case of the Kőszegi-Rabin model of reference-dependent preferences (Kőszegi and Rabin 2007) , with linear gain-loss preferences and coefficient of loss aversion lying in the interval [0 2]. (The model of Kőszegi and Rabin 2007 with other values for the loss aversion coefficient would fail to respect stochastic dominance.) Finally, note that QRDU in turn nests EU, since when λ = 1/2, g λ (p) = p and the formula (7) collapses to expected utility. Now returning to type spaces, say that an interdependent non-EU extension S of T is an interdependent QRDU extension if each function u s i is a quadratic rank-dependent utility function (on lotteries over Y = X × S −i ). We then have the following stronger version of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Suppose n ≥ 2 and that T is any ordinal type space. Let F : T ⇒ (X) be an SCC with F(t) closed for each t ∈ T . If F is strongly implementable over every interdependent QRDU extension of T , then it is implementable by an ordinal mechanism over T .
Note also that since QRDU preferences are nested within the rank-dependent utility, quadratic utility, and Kőszegi-Rabin reference-dependent preference models, Theorem 3 remains true a fortiori when QRDU is replaced by any of these three classes of preferences.
The main idea of the proof is roughly as follows. A QRDU decision-maker with parameter λ > 1/2, who compares two lotteries π and π , down-weights bad outcomes relative to an expected-utility decision-maker. Now suppose that both π and π are diluted by a lottery π concentrated on medium-quality outcomes, so that the QRDU decisionmaker compares δπ + (1 − δ)π against δπ + (1 − δ)π . As δ → 0 and λ → 1, the bad outcomes are down-weighted so much as to become negligible relative to the good ones. Then the comparison essentially hinges on which of π or π gives a higher probability of good outcomes. By varying π , we can use these comparisons to replicate all of the ordinal incentive constraints.
Proof of Theorem 3. Fix any small > 0. We construct an interdependent QRDU extension S of T , with the property that strong implementability over S impliesimplementability by an ordinal mechanism. Since this can be done for every > 0, it then follows just as in the proof of Theorem 1 that F can be implemented by an ordinal mechanism.
Put m = |X|. Let C be a large number, specifically C > 1/ . Let γ δ > 0 be small enough so that
This can be done, since the inequality holds when γ = δ = 0. These choices have the following consequence.
Lemma 1. If (8) holds and∈ [0 1] with q < q − , then
The proof (a simple calculation) is provided in Appendix A. Now we construct our extension S. Define S i , for each agent i, to consist of one type s i (t i ) for each ordinal type t i ∈ T i as well as m "dummy" types s 1 i s m i , whose corresponding ordinal types are specified momentarily. For each t i , rank the indifference classes of t i from top to bottom; let X k [t i ] denote the kth indifference class from the top. Then define a cardinal preference u s i (t i ) : X × S −i → R as follows:
• If s −i is such that, for some k ∈ {1 m}, we have s j = s k j for every agent j = i, then u s i (t i ) (x s −i ) is chosen arbitrarily in the interval (−C k+1 −C k+1 + γδ), such that u s i (t i ) (· s −i ) represents the ordinal preference t i .
• For any other
Now define the preference u s i (t i ) : (X × S −i ) → R as the QRDU preference induced by u s i (t i ) and parameter λ = 1. Also, for each dummy type s k i , arbitrarily pick an associated ordinal type t i ∈ T i , and let u s k i : (X × S −i ) → R be any QRDU preference consistent with type t i (for example, we could choose u s k i to be identical to u s i (t i ) ). This does indeed define an interdependent QRDU extension of T . In particular, the fact that preferences of s i (t i ) respect stochastic dominance with respect to ordering (6) follows from the fact that u s i (t i ) (· s −i ) represents t i for each fixed s −i .
Let M be a mechanism strongly implementing F over S. We claim the ordinal mechanism M given by M (t) = M(s(t)) must -implement F over T . Certainly M (t) ∈ F(t), so we just need to check the ordinal incentive constraints for -implementation.
Consider any t i , t i , and t −i , and any k = 1 m. Consider the probability distribution σ −i over S −i that puts weight δ on s −i (t −i ) and puts remaining weight 1 − δ on s k −i (defined by taking dummy type s k j for each agent j = i). The strong incentive constraint for M, with this probability distribution over s −i , tells us that
Let q be the total probability placed by lottery M(s i (t i ) s −i (t −i )) on the top k indifference classes of t i ; therefore, 1 − q is the total probability placed on lower indifference classes. (If k exceeds the number of indifference classes, then q = 1.) The left-hand side of (10) evaluates a lottery on X × S −i that, by construction, has the following properties: (ii) It places probability 1 − δ on outcomes with cardinal utility in (−C k+1 −C k+1 + γδ).
(iii) It places δq on outcomes with cardinal utility in [−C k 0].
To evaluate this lottery according to (7), outcomes are weighted so that the cumulative probabilities are distorted by g 1 (p) = p 2 . Then the outcomes in (i) and (ii) receive total weight (1 − δq) 2 , and those in (iii) receive the remaining weight 1 − (1 − δq) 2 . Therefore, the value of this lottery according to u s i (t i ) is at most (1 − δq) 2 × (−C k+1 + γδ).
Similarly, let q be the total probability placed by lottery M(s i (t i ) s −i (t −i )) on the top k indifference classes of t i . The right-hand side of (10) evaluates a lottery that has the following properties:
(i ) It places probability δ(1 − q ) on outcomes with cardinal utility in [−C m −C k+1 ].
(ii ) It places probability 1 − δ on outcomes with cardinal utility in (−C k+1 −C k+1 + γδ).
(iii ) It places δq on outcomes with cardinal utility in [−C k 0].
Weighting according to g 1 , the value of this lottery according to u s i (t i ) is at least
Putting these bounds together with (10), we get
Now if q < q − , then Lemma 1 tells us that (9) holds. But (9) is exactly the negation of (11) (after multiplying through by −1); thus we get a contradiction. We conclude that q ≥ q − .
At this point, we have shown that the total probability placed on the top k indifference classes of t i in lottery M(s i (t i ) s −i (t −i )) cannot exceed the corresponding probability in M(s i (t i ) s −i (t −i )) by more than . Since this holds for each k, this exactly gives the ordinal incentive constraints for M to -implement F . Now we take limits as → 0 to infer that F can be implemented by an ordinal mechanism, just as in the proof of Theorem 1.
A couple of remarks are in order. First, we have used only QRDU with parameter λ = 1 here. We could also have instead used λ = 0, so that agents underweight good outcomes rather than bad ones, and a parallel argument would apply.
However, we could not restrict to λ bounded strictly away from 0 and 1, and expect the same proof to work. That is, the proof technique would not succeed if we only allowed QRDU preferences that are "close" to EU. We also could not restrict the interdependence in preferences to be "small" (as we could in Theorem 1; see Section 4.2). While the proof above would not work under either of these restrictions, whether Theorem 3 would remain true is an open question.
Other extensions
There are various ways one can elaborate on the preceding ideas. We indicate a couple of such extensions.
Other sets of utility functions
We have taken as the primitives a space of ordinal types T i for each agent and an SCC F : T → (X), and looked for a theoretical foundation for restricting attention to mechanisms in which agents directly report their ordinal type t i . Given that T is the domain of F , we can think of it as encapsulating the information about agents' preferences that is relevant to the planner's goals. Under interdependence, T also simultaneously represents the information that each agent is presupposed to know for sure about his own preferences.
We have used ordinal preferences as a primitive because of the existing mechanism design literature in this framework. However, we could also imagine allowing the planner's goals to depend on preference information at some other level of granularity, e.g., only on each agent's k most preferred outcomes, or on preferences between some small set of lotteries. We could again ask if such a planner is justified in restricting attention to mechanisms that only elicit this information, based on uncertainty about finer preferences.
For this more general model, following the ideas of Carroll (2010 Carroll ( , 2012 , Dubra et al. (2004) , we could define a type t i of agent i to be a nonempty set of utility functions from X to R. A type space would be a finite set of types. (Ordinal types then consist of sets of the form {u i | u i represents i } for some weak order i on X.) Cardinal extensions would be defined as before, with the requirement "s i represents t i " changed to "s i ∈ t i ," and analogously for interdependent cardinal extensions. A mechanism M : T → (X) would implement F if M(t) ∈ F(t) for all t, and u i (M(t i t −i )) ≥ u i (M(t i t −i )) for all t i , t i , t −i and all u i ∈ t i .
Theorem 1 can be generalized to this setting. Instead of imposing that preferences are strict, the requirement would be that each type t i of each agent should be an open set. The proof requires only minor adaptations.
Bayesian implementation
All of our analysis has been based on ex post implementation. This is in accordance with the existing literature, as discussed in the Introduction. However, it is natural to try to ask the same questions in the paradigm of Bayesian implementation instead. We briefly present findings here; details of the definitions and examples can be found in Appendix B. We assume n ≥ 2, since Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation coincide for n = 1.
To study Bayesian implementation, type spaces (in either their ordinal or cardinal versions) need to be supplemented with priors: each type of each agent should be endowed with a distribution over the types of other agents. Then, in an ordinal environment, the natural incentive-compatibility condition for a direct mechanism is ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC) (d' Aspremont and Peleg 1988 , Majumdar and Sen 2004 , Bhargava et al. 2015 , Mishra 2016 . This criterion says that for each agent i, the lottery he gets by reporting his true type t i always first-order stochastically dominates any lottery he could get by reporting another type t i , where the lotteries result from i's subjective uncertainty about others' types as well as any possible randomization in the mechanism conditional on the type profile. Now consider first cardinal extensions without interdependence. If an SCC F can be implemented by an ordinal mechanism (using ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility as the criterion), then it is also implementable over any cardinal extension of the type space, with compatible priors. If the converse were true, we would have a foundation for ordinal mechanisms in the Bayesian framework. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The Appendix shows a simple counterexample, extending the ideas from Examples 1 and 3.
What happens when we allow interdependence? In this case, even the "forward" direction, from (Q1) to (Q2), fails: an SCC may be implemented (in the OBIC sense) by an ordinal mechanism, yet not implementable over an interdependent cardinal extension of the type space. The Appendix illustrates this with a simple example. So asking the converse question seems unmotivated. That is, in the Bayesian setting with interdependence, it is not even clear what statement one would try to prove to give a foundation for ordinal mechanisms.
Summary
We close with a review of our main findings and a brief discussion. This paper was motivated by recent literature on randomized mechanisms for agents with ordinal preferences over outcomes. This literature generally looks for mechanisms in which agents report their ordinal preferences, and truthfulness is a dominant strategy. We undertook a quest for theoretical justifications for restricting attention to ordinal mechanisms. Specifically, following the approach of Bergemann and Morris (2005) , we asked the following question. Suppose the agents have preferences over lotteries, but these preferences are not known to the planner, and the planner's goals do not depend on more than the ordinal preferences. Suppose that these goals can always be implemented by some mechanism no matter what the agents' true preferences are (with ex post implementation as the solution concept). Does it follow that the goals can be implemented by an ordinal mechanism? If so, we say that we have a foundation for ordinal mechanisms. In this case, the desire for robustness to uncertainty about the agents' exact preferences allows the planner to restrict her attention to ordinal mechanisms.
Whether this foundation exists depends on just how much robustness is desired. There are several robustness criteria that do give such a foundation.
• If there is just one agent, then there is a foundation for ordinal mechanisms if we assume the SCC expressing the planner's goals is simple (Proposition 2).
• If there are multiple agents whose ordinal preferences over all outcomes are strict, and the planner desires robustness to interdependence in their cardinal preferences, then we again obtain a foundation for ordinal mechanisms (Theorem 1). Interdependence can be justified by supposing that agents have some uncertainty about their own cardinal preferences, which might depend on unobserved fundamentals and thereby be correlated with other agents' types. The result holds even if we require robustness only to a small amount of interdependence.
• If there are multiple agents and weak preferences are possible, but the planner desires robustness to interdependence and to non-expected utility, then we again have a foundation for ordinal mechanisms (Theorem 2). This foundation remains valid if preferences are restricted to the QRDU class (Theorem 3), which lies within several commonly studied models: rank-dependent utility, quadratic utility, and Kőszegi-Rabin reference-dependent preferences.
However, in each of these cases, if we remove any one of the conditions, then we lose the foundation for ordinal mechanisms. Specifically, in each of the following situations, we can give an SCC that is robustly implementable but not using an ordinal mechanism:
• One agent and a non-simple SCC (Example 1).
• Multiple agents who know their own preferences over lotteries, even if it is required that ordinal preferences are strict, the SCC is simple and arbitrary nonexpected utility is possible (Examples 3 and 8).
• Multiple agents with weak ordinal preferences and interdependent cardinal preferences, but who adhere to expected utility (Example 4).
We have adopted a modeling framework that focuses on possibility or impossibility of implementing a given SCC. Not all questions that have been studied in the ordinal mechanism literature fall within this framework. In particular, results that characterize all mechanisms that implement an SCC, such as the random dictatorship result of Chatterji et al. (2014) , do not map exactly into our framework. However, the approach here seems to be natural if we want a framework that transcends any particular application.
Our results can be interpreted positively or negatively. The positive interpretation is that they provide a justification for looking at ordinal mechanisms in situations where a sufficient amount of robustness is desired. For example, return to the object allocation problem of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) from the Introduction. They showed that no strategy-proof ordinal mechanism guarantees an ordinally efficient random allocation that satisfies equal treatment of equals. We can apply Theorem 2 to conclude that no ex-post mechanism, ordinal or not, guarantees these properties while being robust to interdependent, non-expected-utility preferences.
The negative interpretation of our findings is that if the planner does not desire too much robustness, then focusing attention on ordinal mechanisms may entail a loss of generality. From this point of view, a fully satisfactory analysis of such a mechanism design problem should allow agents to express non-ordinal preferences.
Unfortunately, the study of strategy-proof randomized mechanisms that elicit cardinal preferences has proven to be analytically quite difficult. (The literature on such problems consists of a small handful of papers; see Zhou 1990 , Barberà et al. 1998 , Freixas 1984 , Hylland 1980 , Schummer 1999 , Filos-Ratsikas et al. 2014 For this reason, realistically, future theoretical work in these domains is likely to continue focusing on ordinal mechanisms.
One potential direction for progress, rather than focusing on impossibility and possibility results as in this paper, would be to identify situations where a small departure from ordinal mechanisms provides clear benefits. Here is a simple example, based on the idea of Example 1.
Return to the object allocation setting as in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) , with four agents, but now suppose that all agents are known in advance to have the same ranking over objects, a b c d. Since we are now interested in making low robustness demands, assume agents know their own cardinal preferences.
If a mechanism can only use ordinal preferences (which are already known), then essentially the only fair allocation would be assigning the objects uniformly at random; let π denote this lottery. But as an alternative, consider the following non-ordinal mechanism. Take the lottery π that allocates a and d randomly (uniformly) between the first two agents, and allocates b and c randomly between the last two. Ask each agent to report a preference between π and π , and choose π only if all agents prefer it. This mechanism retains the advantage of strategy-proofness and gives a (cardinal) Pareto improvement over the ordinal mechanism that simply assigns π.
Looking for easy improvements of this sort could be a natural direction to advance beyond purely ordinal mechanisms in specific applications. (Kesten 2010 makes a somewhat related proposal in a school choice setting.)
Appendix A: Omitted proofs and examples
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (a). Suppose F is an SCF that cannot be implemented by an ordinal mechanism. So for some i, there exist t i , t i , and t −i such that F(t i t −i ) does not first-order stochastically dominate F(t i t −i ) with respect to preferences t i . Then we can find a cardinal utility function s i that represents t i such that s i (F(t i t −i )) < s i (F(t i t −i )). Take S to be any cardinal extension of T in which s i is a possible type of agent i; then F cannot be implemented over S.
Part (b). Suppose F is deterministic. Let S be any cardinal extension of T , and suppose F is implemented over S by mechanism M. For each t i ∈ T , choose some s i (t i ) ∈ S i that represents t i . Write s(t) = (s 1 (t 1 ) s n (t n )). Then F is implemented over T by the ordinal mechanism t → M(s(t)). (In effect, comparison by expected utility is the same as comparison by stochastic dominance when the lotteries being compared are degenerate.)
Proof of Proposition 2. For every ordinal type t 1 and every nonempty set Z ⊆ X, write Top(Z|t 1 ) for the set of elements of Z that are most preferred by type t 1 . (This set may contain more than one element if there are indifferences.) Also, for each ordinal type t 1 ∈ T 1 , define G(t 1 ) to be the nonempty subset of X such that F(t 1 ) = (G(t 1 )).
We now construct a sequence of subsets Z 0 Z r ⊆ X and a sequence of types t 1 1 t r 1 ∈ T 1 as follows.
-If, for every t 1 , we have G(t 1 ) ∩ Top(Z k−1 |t 1 ) = ∅, then stop, setting r = k − 1.
Since Z 0 Z 1 is a strictly decreasing sequence of subsets of the finite set X, the algorithm must eventually terminate.
The interpretation of the algorithm is that we successively eliminate elements of X that cannot be chosen with positive probability by M(t 1 ) for any t 1 , if M is to be an ordinal mechanism that implements F . To understand this, consider Step 1 and suppose some type t 1 1 is chosen in that step. If the desired mechanism M exists, it cannot give type t 1 1 any of its top-ranked outcomes (in X) with positive probability, since the SCC prohibits them. Then ordinal incentive compatibility implies that none of t 1 1 's top-ranked outcomes can be assigned positive probability under any type t 1 ; so these outcomes are eliminated entirely from the range of M. Thus, for all t 1 , we have M(t 1 ) ∈ (Z 1 ). This argument can be iterated to show that M(t 1 ) ∈ (Z k ) for each k. Now, if the final set Z r is nonempty, then we can find a deterministic, ordinal mechanism M that implements F . Namely, for each t 1 , let M(t 1 ) put probability 1 on some outcome in G(t 1 ) ∩ Top(Z r |t 1 ). (Such an outcome exists, by the termination condition for the algorithm.) Then each type t 1 is assigned one of its favorite elements of the set Z r , and since agent 1 could only get a different element of Z r by misreporting, each type's incentive constraints are satisfied. Moreover, M assigns to each type t 1 one of the acceptable outcomes in G(t 1 ). So M implements F . Therefore, if F cannot be implemented by such a mechanism, then Z r = ∅. In this case, we proceed to construct a minimal cardinal extension of T 1 over which F cannot be implemented. Let C be a large positive constant.
We construct, for each type t 1 ∈ T 1 , a utility function s 1 (t 1 ) as follows.
• If t 1 is not equal to t k 1 for any k, then s 1 may be any utility function that represents t 1 .
• Otherwise, for each x ∈ X, define its rank with respect to t 1 , notated k(x) (with the dependence on t 1 implicit), to be the earliest step k such that t 1 = t k 1 and x t 1 Top(Z k−1 |t 1 ) (this abuse of notation is unambiguous since t 1 is indifferent among all elements of Top(Z k−1 |t 1 )). If no such step exists, then take k(x) = r + 1.
Notice that if x t 1 y, then k(x) ≤ k(y); hence, C 3 r+1−k(x) ≥ C 3 r+1−k(y) . Consequently, we can find a utility function s 1 (t 1 ) that represents t 1 , such that
for all outcomes x.
Thus each s 1 (t 1 ) represents t 1 . Let S 1 be the space consisting of the cardinal types thus constructed. Suppose, seeking a contradiction, that some mechanism M represents F over S 1 .
We claim that for each k and each type s 1 , M(s 1 ) puts total probability at most 1/C 3 r−k on outcomes not in Z k .
The proof of the claim is by induction. The base case k = 0 is trivial since Z 0 = X. If the claim holds for k − 1, then consider the ordinal type t * 1 = t k 1 chosen at step k, with its corresponding cardinal type s * 1 . This ordinal type may have been chosen at some previous steps as well. Thus, let k 1 < k 2 < · · · < k q = k be all the steps k ≤ k such that t * 1 = t k 1 (we may have q = 1 if there were no previous such steps). Also put k 0 = 0 for convenience.
We now bound from above the utility attained by type s * 1 in the mechanism M. Consider any outcome x of rank ≤ k with respect to t * 1 . This rank must be k j for some j. By definition of rank, x t * 1 Top(Z k j −1 |t * 1 ). Now if x is assigned positive probability by M(s * 1 ), then x / ∈ Top(Z k j −1 |t * 1 ), since by construction the latter set consists only of outcomes that are not in G(t k j 1 ) = G(t * 1 ). Therefore, x / ∈ Z k j −1 . Since k j −1 < k, we can apply the induction hypothesis to see that the set of all x of rank k j then has total probability at most 1/C 3 r−(k j −1) .
However, any x of rank k j gives cardinal utility at most C 3 r+1−k j + 1 to type s * 1 , by virtue of the construction of its utility function. So the outcomes of rank k j contribute a total of at most
to the utility of type s * 1 . The right-hand side is certainly smaller than, say, 2. Finally, summing over all of the k j , we see that the outcomes of rank at most k contribute at most 2r to the utility of type s * 1 . Meanwhile, the outcomes of any rank at least k + 1 each give type s * 1 a utility of at most C 3 r+1−(k+1) + 1 = C 3 r−k + 1. So altogether, the utility achieved by type s * 1 in mechanism M satisfies
However, every outcome in Z k−1 \ Z k = Top(Z k−1 |t * 1 ) has rank k and so gives s * 1 a cardinal utility of at least C 3 r+1−k . Hence, for any cardinal type s 1 , the lottery M(s 1 ) can assign total probability at most
to these outcomes, otherwise s * 1 would benefit from imitating s 1 in mechanism M, violating the incentive constraint.
Combining this with the induction hypothesis-that for all cardinal types s 1 , the lottery M(s 1 ) assigns total probability at most C −3 r+1−k to outcomes not in Z k−1 -we conclude that M(s 1 ) assigns total probability at most C −3 r+1−k + C (−2)·3 r−k + (2r + 1)C −3 r+1−k to outcomes not in Z k . As long as C is large enough, this expression is less than C −3 r−k . Thus, we can see that for all s 1 , the total probability assigned by lottery M(s 1 ) to outcomes not in Z k is at most C −3 r−k . This completes the induction step and proves the claim.
Finally, taking r = k in the claim, we see that for each s 1 , the total probability assigned to outcomes in X \Z r is at most C −3 r−r = C −1 . But Z r = ∅, so this total probability should be 1, a contradiction.
So either our elimination algorithm leads to Z r = ∅, in which case F can be implemented by a deterministic ordinal mechanism, or leads to Z r = ∅, in which case we have a minimal cardinal extension of T 1 over which F is not implementable. The proposition follows.
For each value d ∈ {1
.) There are no inconsistencies in the specifications we have made so far; that is, we have never defined the utility function for the same agent at the same type profile twice. Moreover, for each agent i, all the utility functions we have assigned at any cardinal type profile in which i has a type s j k t i do indeed represent the ordinal type t i . Finally, for each agent i, for all of the cardinal type profiles s for which we have not yet defined a utility function, we can simply let u i (· s) be any function at all that represents the ordinal type associated with s i . This completes the construction of (S u) and ensures that it is indeed an interdependent cardinal extension of T .
Let us complete the proof. For each > 0, we can find an M : T → (X) thatimplements F . By using compactness and passing to a subsequence if necessary, we have a sequence of values → 0 along which the M (t) converge for every t. Let M 0 (t) be the corresponding limit. This defines an ordinal mechanism M 0 . We have M 0 (t) ∈ F(t) for each t because M (t) ∈ F(t) and F(t) is closed. Moreover, for each , the mechanism M satisfies every incentive constraint (1); taking limits as → 0, we see that the limit mechanism M 0 satisfies the exact incentive constraints needed to implement F . So M 0 implements F over T .
Example 7. Here is an example of an SCC with one agent that is very strongly implementable over every (independent) non-EU extension, but not implementable by any ordinal mechanism.
Just consider the following minor modification of Example 1:
c d e f g h t 3 : t 2 t 2 t 1 t 1 x x y y x x y y x x y y x x y y This F cannot be implemented by an ordinal mechanism. Such a mechanism would have to specify 1 2 − 1 2 lotteries over the acceptable outcomes whenever agent 3 has ordinal type t 3 or t 3 , and then there would be no way to choose the lottery at (t 1 t 2 t 3 ) to satisfy the incentive constraints of all types of agent 3; the calculations are essentially identical to those in Example 3.
However, for any non-EU extension S of T , we can very strongly implement F over S as follows. If the agents report types such that 3's ordinal preferences correspond to t 3 or t 3 , then carry out the 1 2 − 1 2 lottery over the two outcomes allowed by F . Otherwise, ignore the types of agents 1 and 2, and carry out whichever of the lotteries
is most preferred by agent 3's non-EU type. We now verify that this mechanism very strongly implements F . If agent 3 has ordinal preferences t 3 or t 3 , then every agent's ordinal incentive constraints are satisfied, so a fortiori the non-EU type has no incentive to deviate (including mixed-strategy deviations). If agent 3 has ordinal preferences t 3 , then the outcome is independent of the types reported by agents 1 and 2, so their incentive constraints are satisfied. It remains only to check the incentive constraint of each type s 3 of agent 3 with ordinal preferences t 3 . Suppose that s 3 is assigned its most preferred lottery π(s 3 ) = α 1 2
x + 1 2 y + (1 − α) 1 2
x + 1 2 y
Suppose agent 3 considers some (possibly mixed) deviation. Let σ 1 2 ∈ (T 1 × T 2 ) denote 3's marginal belief about the others' ordinal types (t 1 (s 1 ) t 2 (s 2 )), and let σ 3 be the marginal distribution over 3's ordinal types under the proposed deviation. This deviation would then lead to the lottery σ 3 (t 3 ) σ 1 2 (t 1 t 2 ) 1 2 a + 1 2 b + σ 1 2 t 1 t 2 1 2 c + 1 2 d + σ 1 2 t 1 t 2 1 2 e + 1 2 f + σ 1 2 t 1 t 2 1 2 g + 1 2 h + σ 3 t 3 σ 1 2 (t 1 t 2 ) 1 2 a + 1 2 b + σ 1 2 t 1 t 2 1 2 c + 1 2 d + σ 1 2 t 1 t 2 1 2 e + 1 2 f + σ 1 2 t 1 t 2 1 2 g + 1 2 h + σ 3 t 3 β 1 2
x + 1 2 y + (1 − β) 1 2
Here β is some number that represents an average of the lottery weights obtained by all the other non-EU types corresponding to t 3 in the support of agent 3's random deviation. This lottery is stochastically dominated for agent 3 by the lottery obtained from it by performing the replacements
This latter lottery is equal to
Finally, we know this is less preferred for s 3 than the originally assigned lottery π(s 3 ), by construction of π(s 3 ). Thus the proposed (random) deviation is not profitable for s 3 , and the verification of very strong implementation is concluded. ♦ Proof of Lemma 1. Since the left-hand side of (9) is decreasing in q (for q ≤ 1), it suffices to hold fixed q and show (9) at q = q − . By moving the C k+1 term to the left side and multiplying out, (9) is equivalent to
The left-hand side is bounded below by (2δ − 4δ 2 )C k+1 − 4γδ, and the right-hand side is bounded above by δ 2 C m + 2δC k . Hence, multiplying (8) through by δ, we see that it implies (18) and, therefore, (9).
Appendix B: Details on Bayesian implementation
We flesh out here some details on Bayesian implementation, originally sketched in Section 6.2. For Bayesian implementation, type spaces should come equipped with priors. Suppose T = T 1 × · · · × T n is an ordinal type space, and suppose we are given, for each type t i of each agent, a belief p t i ∈ (T −i ). (The family of beliefs p = (p t i ) may come from a common prior over T , but this is not necessary.)
Given an SCC F : T ⇒ (X), we say that an ordinal mechanism M : T → (X) Bayesian implements F if M(t) ∈ F(t) for each t, and for every agent i, all t i t i ∈ T i , and all outcomes x ∈ X, y t i x t −i ∈T −i p t i (t −i )M(t i t −i )(y) ≥ y t i x t −i ∈T −i p t i (t −i )M t i t −i (y) ences are t 1 , then prescribe either a when 2's ordinal preferences are t 2 and b when t 2 , or else c when t 2 and d when t 2 , depending on which of the two lotteries 1 2 a + 1 2 b, 1 2 c + 1 2 d is preferred by 1's cardinal type.
However, F is not Bayesian implementable by any mechanism M over the ordinal type space T : the incentive constraints of the various types of agent 1 cannot all be satisfied, by exactly the same argument as in Example 3.
We now move to allow interdependence in cardinal utilities. In this case, as stated in the main text, an SCC F may be Bayesian implementable over an ordinal type space T , yet not implementable over some interdependent extension S with compatible priors.
Here is a concrete example. Suppose there are two agents and two ordinal types of each agent, and the priors are uniform. Consider two outcomes X = {a b}, and the following preferences and SCC (actually SCF) F :
This obviously gives a unique ordinal mechanism, which is Bayesian incentive compatible (each agent gets the lottery 1 2 a + 1 2 b no matter what type he reports). However, consider an interdependent cardinal extension with corresponding types s 1 , s 1 , s 2 , and s 2 , and uniform priors. Suppose that the utility function of type s 1 is u 1 (a s 1 s 2 ) = 1 u 1 (b s 1 s 2 ) = 0 u 1 a s 1 s 2 = 2 u 1 b s 1 s 2 = 0
Then for the unique mechanism consistent with F , type s 1 gets expected utility of 1 2 from reporting s 1 but 1 from reporting s 1 . The mechanism is not incentive compatible. Thus F is not implementable.
Essentially, the problem is that once we let s i 's cardinal utility vary freely depending on s −i , this freedom undoes any discipline imposed by the priors. (A version of this observation was previously made in Ledyard 1986.) 
